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China’s economic growth has been rapid since its economic reform and 
open-door policy of 1978. It tries to maintain an 8 per cent annual growth 
rate in the face of the worldwide economic downturn by ramping up gov-
ernment spending. On the other hand, it has been experiencing serious 
environmental pollution resulting from rapid industrialization and urban-
ization. In response, the central government has gradually initiated coun-
termeasures, starting with a programme to combat water pollution in the 
Huai River basin in 1994.
Despite such efforts, the environmental problems are still serious. In 
addition, greenhouse gas (GHG) emission has been continuously rising. 
The average annual rate of increase since 1995 is approximately 8 per 
cent; the rate has exceeded 10 per cent since 2000 when economic growth 
accelerated again. In particular, the amount of CO2 (carbon dioxide) 
emissions from electricity generation and heat has increased at an aver-
age annual rate of 15.7 per cent for the 11 years from 1995 to 2006 (Fig-
ure 4.4.1). As a result, in 2005 the amount of GHG emissions in China 
surpassed that in the United States, and it became the world’s largest 
emitter (Figure 4.4.2). Moreover, China’s CO2 emission, which was 
ranked number two in the world in 2006, became number one in 2007.
Continued increase in GHG emissions in China is not only attributed 
to economic growth and an accompanying rise in energy consumption: 
lack of clear emission reduction targets and clear policies to achieve them 
CDM POLICY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 149
 
might have given little incentive for local governments and firms to re-
duce GHG emissions.
Even in such a policy climate, efficient energy use, greater use of re-
newable energies and the clean development mechanism (CDM) have 
been implemented to overcome the vicious cycle of increasing reliance 
on coal, inefficient energy supply and air pollution (Mori, 2011). The 
CDM is a mechanism in which the Annex I countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol organize projects to reduce emissions or increase sequestration 
by providing developing countries with technical or financial assistance, 
and count a certain portion of the resulting GHG reductions as part of 
what the Annex I countries themselves must achieve.
This “flexible” mechanism is established as a complement to reduce 
GHG emissions in Annex I countries. However, it is criticized for concen-
tration in specific types of projects and specific nations, and little consid-
eration for sustainable development in developing countries. To use the 
CDM as a tool for advancing sustainable development, SouthSouthNorth 
(2003) and Sutter and Parreño (2007) argue ways to improve its institutions. 




The World Wildlife Fund proposed the Gold Standard that labels high-
quality certified emissions reductions (CERs) in the carbon market. 
China has shown interest in contributions to sustainable development 
that CDM projects would make. However, the more emphasis developing 
countries put on such contributions, the less support from Annex I coun-
tries, which leads to few investments.
Assuming a trade-off between GHG reduction and sustainable devel-
opment in host countries, domestic policies in the host country may have 
a large impact on the magnitude of contributions that CDM projects 
make to sustainable development. This chapter examines this potential 
by investigating a biogas CDM project for small-scale pig farms in rural 
areas, and agricultural policies in China.
4-4-2 CDM policy in China
In the 1990s the Chinese government was very cautious about the nego-
tiation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC): it may have mandated GHG reduction even in developing 
countries, including China, which would hinder its domestic economic 
growth. China judged that maintaining a representative role among the 
developing countries opposing such obligations (the G-77) would work 
advantageously in international politics (Kobayashi, 2002).
Figure 4.4.2 World greenhouse gas emissions, 2005
Source: OECD (2008).
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Once the CDM rules and regulations were specified at the UNFCCC 
Seventh Conference of the Parties, however, the Chinese government 
b egan to examine the effect of the CDM with support from the World 
Bank. Consequently, it recognized that the CDM would bring the country 
five benefits: an increase in net foreign direct investment amounting to 
US$475 million; improved efficiency in generation and consumption of 
electricity; a 0.5 per cent rise in GDP through investment in advanced 
technology and increased domestic production; development of local 
economies through technology transfers and tax revenues; and increased 
efficiency in energy use and the use of waste resulting from electricity 
generation (Nygard et al., 2004). With such research results, the country 
started to recognize that proactive use of the CDM would enable the 
achievement of policy goals such as stable energy supply and efficient use 
of energy.
In addition, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol take the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibility”, stating that they do not 
oblige developing countries to reduce GHG emissions. Hence, China rati-
fied both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in hope of additional 
funds from the Global Environment Facility as well as technological 
transfers and fund inflows through the CDM (zhang, 2002).
China then announced the Interim Measures for the Operation and 
Management of CDM Projects in 2004 and the Measures for the Opera-
tion and Management of CDM Projects in 2005, declaring the govern-
ment would actively promote CDM projects. It also announced a critical 
notification regarding the standardization of CDM projects, consulting 
services and evaluation activities in China.
Further, the government formulated China’s National Climate Change 
Programme in 2007 to show targets, basic principles, focal areas and 
p olicy measures for climate change activities by 2010. As a goal of GHG 
emission reduction, the programme clearly states an increase of the share 
of renewable energy, including large-scale hydroelectric power plants in 
primary energy supply going up to 10 per cent and an increase in the 
e xtraction of coal-bed methane to 10 billion m3, alongside a 20 per cent 
reduction in energy consumption per unit of GDP relative to its 2005 
level described in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. The programme also out-
lines a reduction of GHG emissions in 2010 by 200 million tonnes of 
CO2-equivalent through coal-bed and coalmine methane CDM projects, 
and by 30 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent through the promotion of 
biomass energy. The government is planning to have a target to improve 
energy consumption per unit of GDP by 17 per cent in the Twelfth Five-
Year Plan (2011–2015).1 By publicizing these active measures and plans 
globally, the Chinese government intends to avoid an obligation to r educe 
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emissions in a post-2012 international framework for preventing climate 
change.
4-4-3 Features of CDM policy in China
There are three main features in CDM policy in China. First, it stipulates 
that profits made through transfers of CERs belong to the Chinese gov-
ernment and CDM project entities. Based on this provision, the Chinese 
government has a legal right to collect its share of revenue from the sales 
of CERs.
Second, the difference in the treatment of preferred and non-preferred 
subsectors in CDM projects is remarkably large. Three subsectors – 
i mprovement of energy efficiency; renewable energy; and recovery of me-
thane, coal-bed methane and coalmine methane – are designated as key 
and receive preferential treatment in various procedures, plus tax of only 
2 per cent of the revenue from the sales of CERs. In contrast, the govern-
ment’s share in the revenue from CER sales is set higher for hydrochloro-
fluorocarbon (HFC-23) and nitrous oxide (N2O), at 65 and 30 per cent, 
respectively.
Third, entry by foreign entities is strictly restricted. The government 
limits the entities permitted to enter CDM projects to Chinese c ompanies 
and firms with a Chinese holding company having 51 per cent or more of 
their shares. Reflecting this restriction, many CDM projects are proposed 
without a merger or technology partnership with a foreign company, and 
applications sent to the Chinese government or the CDM executive 
board for approval indicate that the participation of foreign companies 
tends to be limited to CER purchases.
4-4-4 The current state of CDM projects in China
China has become the nation with the largest number of CDM projects 
and amount of CERs. The number of CDM projects in China registered 
with the United Nations has drastically risen since 2007. As of May 2009 
it had 564 registered projects, which surpassed India’s 428 projects and 
dwarfed Brazil’s 158. The amount of GHG emission reduction by 2012 
rises to 887.86 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent for China – almost four 
times the amount for India (Table 4.4.1).
This rapid increase is partly attributed to a unique feature of CDM 
projects in China. Until 2007 the majority of CERs came from HFC-23 
reduction schemes that produced a large amount of CERs per project 
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with low project risks, and were thus regarded as the most cost-efficient 
CDM projects. However, no more HFC-23 reduction projects are ex-
pected to be proposed because all the feasible projects from existing 
f actories producing HCFC-22 have been approved, and the UNFCCC 
Conference of Parties decided that it would no longer approve the reduc-
tion of HFC-23 from any new HCFC-22 producing factories. S ubsequently, 
the reduction of nitrous oxide at factories and the recovery of coal-bed 
and coalmine methane are attracting attention due to perceived higher 
cost-effectiveness with lower risks.
CDM projects were also encouraged by the enactment of the Re-
newable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China in 2006. This law 
defines renewable energy as non-fossil (e.g. wind, solar, biomass, geother-
mal and ocean) energies, and does not include direct burning of straw, 
firewood or excreta in low-efficiency stoves. The law also states that the 
central government encourages renewable energies in rural areas, and 
that energy offices of local governments (above prefecture level) and rel-
evant bureaucratic divisions must prepare plans for renewable energy de-
velopment in rural areas and provide technical and financial support for 
the use of biogas from biomass, household solar energy and small-scale 
wind turbines and hydropower, taking into account different conditions 
in each region. Also, as a measure to promote renewable electricity, a de 
facto feed-in tariff is introduced to mandate power grids to conclude 
agreements to purchase all the renewable electricity generated by com-
panies that obtain a government permit or are registered through submit-
ting a report. If a grid operator does not purchase all the electricity, it 
faces a fine with an upper limit of twice the amount of economic losses 
sustained by power generation companies. The price for biomass electric 
power paid by the grid is set at an amount equalling each province’s 
Table 4.4.1 Number of CDM projects and volume of CERs by host country
Number of 
projects
CERs up to 2012 (million 
tonnes of CO2-equivalent)
China  564  888
India  428  239
Brazil  158  134
Mexico  114   48
Malaysia   46   17
Chile   32   29
South Korea   27   95
Indonesia   24   19
Argentina   15   27




2005 standard purchasing price for grid-produced electricity from desul-
phurized coal-fired plants plus 0.25 yuan/kWh. This led to a rapid in-
crease in the number of CDM projects in renewable energy, including 
small-scale hydropower and biogas as well as wind power (Table 4.4.2).
Wind power and small-scale hydropower projects, however, do not nec-
essarily improve the environment or advance sustainable development in 
the communities near the project site. They may cause noise problems 
and changes in land use, including the expropriation of farmland, and 
generated power is not always distributed at a price affordable to com-
munities, thus perhaps worsening their standard of living.2
On the other hand, small-scale biogas or biomass projects are more 
likely to bring about the supply of electricity and gas to communities, a 
resulting decrease in deforestation, suppressed respiratory diseases due 
to reduced use of firewood and coal, and improvement in indoor pollu-
tion. Thus they have greater potential for improving the quality of life. 
Paying attention to these sustainable development impacts, the Chinese 
government has encouraged installing methane gas digesters for livestock 
at individual farms by providing a subsidy of 800 yuan per installation 
since 2000, when it entirely banned deforestation. The government pro-
vided an annual subsidy of 20 –30 million yuan before 2000; this increased 
to 100 million yuan in 2000, 1 billion yuan in 2003 and 2.5 billion yuan 
in 2006 – a 100-fold increase. Despite this effort, in Hunan province, for 
example, only 30 – 40 out of 122 prefecture and district governments could 
obtain the subsidy annually, and the number was just 10 –20 for county 




CERs up to 2012 (million 
tonnes of CO2-equivalent)
HFC reduction  11 366
N2O reduction  26 103
Cement   3   3
Methane recovery  37  77
Methane avoidance   2   0
Afforestation   1   0
Fuel change  14  69
Waste gas and heat  63  70
Hydropower 267 118
Wind power 125  72
Biogas   3   1
Biomass  11   9
Other renewable energy   1   0
Total 564 888
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and village governments. These figures show that diffusion has been much 
slower than planned.3
The government therefore attempted to promote the existing measure 
by redesigning it as a CDM project and obtaining additional revenue 
from the acquisition of CERs. Two biogas CDM projects for pig farms 
were registered with the UNFCCC by June 2009: one is targeted at rela-
tively large specialized pig farms; the other is for installing biogas di-
gesters at rural small farms, which we examine in the following section.
4-4-5 Potential of a livestock-waste CDM project for 
sustainable rural development: The case of Enshi Tujia and 
Miao autonomous prefecture
The Eco-farming Biogas Project for Enshi Tujia and Miao autonomous 
prefecture, Hubei province, is designed to install biogas digesters at 
33,000 farming households located in nationally designated impoverished 
areas in two county-level cities (Enshi and Lichuan) and six counties 
(Xuanen, Jianshi, Badong, Xianfeng, Laifeng and Hefeng) that are con-
stituents of a prefecture in a poverty-stricken mountainous region. The 
project aims to reduce methane gas emissions by installing digesters to 
supplement the use of coal, and expects to cut the amount of GHG emis-
sion by 580,000 tonnes of CO2-equivalent during a 10-year credit period. 
The biogas digesters used in this project are, in principle, those specified 
in the technological standards set by the Chinese government, and plan-
ning and construction are provided by engineers certified by the Minis-
try of Agriculture; there is no technology transfer from the Annex I 
countries.
As shown in the feasibility study for a CDM project in Dingcheng dis-
trict in Changde city, Hunan province, biogas CDM projects for pig farms 
can produce large net benefits not only for the entire project but also for 
farmers, because they enable farmers to reduce expenditures due to the 
substitution for fossil fuel and chemical fertilizer and saving time that 
would have been used for collecting firewood or charcoal (Table 4.4.3). 
The study also shows that there is no incentive for private entities to in-
vest in such projects because, assuming that they bear most of the invest-
ment costs, they cannot recover these. In order for private entities to 
recover their costs, project design must be adjusted so that farmers pay at 
least a portion of the investment. However, the initial cost is higher than 
farmers’ annual income, while benefits are rather intangible – in the form 
of expenditure reductions. Therefore, farmers tend to perceive their own 
burden as higher and benefits as lower. In addition, the more remotely 
farmers are located from urban areas, the less opportunity they have to 
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find a part-time job, which makes it difficult for them to take advantage 
of time saving by earning more income. Time saving may turn into addi-
tional leisure time, or give an incentive for young farmers to work in a 
large coastal city for long periods, leaving farming to the elders. In the 
latter case, installed biogas digesters do not get used sufficiently. For this 
reason farmers are reluctant to install digesters, even if the government 
provides a subsidy of 800 yuan, let alone bear part of the investment costs.
The Eco-farming Biogas Project for Enshi Tujia and Miao tries to over-
come this challenge, being a CDM project led by local government. The 
project has four characteristics. First, farmers should bear construction 
and maintenance costs of biogas digesters. Second, to reduce the burden 
of initial investment costs borne by farmers, the credit union of the local 
government sets up a finance programme with the government’s CER 
revenue as collateral. Third, to prevent insufficient maintenance by 
f armers to allow assured acquisition of CERs, the project operating en-
tity, not farmers, does the actual installation and maintenance and re-
ceives compensation from farmers. Fourth, a project management office 
is established in the local government to utilize CER revenue to enhance 
technical assistance and instruction to village governments. According to 
the project design document, these measures can produce a positive net 
benefit for farmers and the entire project, and enable the project entity 
to recover costs even though benefits associated with time saving do not 
arise (Table 4.4.4).







CER   908     0   19   927
Saving of fossil fuel     0  4,698    0  4,698
Saving of chemical fertilizer     0  5,813    0  5,813
Time saving     0  8,618    0  8,618
Cost
Construction  1,600     0  800  2,400
Maintenance     0     0    0     0
Transaction  1,000     0    0  1,000
Profit –1,692 19,129 –781 16,656
Notes:
CER price is assumed as US$10 per tonne of CO2-equivalent.
Discount rate and credit period are assumed as 10 per cent and 10 years respec-
tively.
Transaction cost is discussed in Michaelowa et al. (2003).
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This project is, however, merely government coercion to achieve its 
policy goal of diffusing biogas digesters in which it installs biogas di-
gesters first, and forces farmers to pay compensation for the cost after-
wards. In order to pay compensation, a farmer has two options: sustain 
operation of biogas digesters to save enough from reduced use of coal, 
briquettes and chemical fertilizers; or let young generations work in large 
cities for a period long enough to earn income exceeding the amount of 
loan repayment. The former choice increases the risk of pests emerging 
due to the transition to organic fertilizers in circumstances where a 
farmer cannot expect increased productivity by expanding farm size 
(Takahashi, 2009). There is also a risk of not getting biogas if swine influ-
enza spreads.4 To avoid such risks, farmers continue to use fossil fuel and 
chemical fertilizers and are not inclined to install biogas digesters, nor 
completely replace production and consumption as shown in Table 4.4.4. 
The latter choice depends on the availability of jobs in large cities.
If farmers cannot repay their loan, they have no choice but to sell their 
right to use land to large agricultural corporations in the process of liquid-
ating their assets.5 Traditionally, land-use rights have been the last resort 
that have guaranteed work and subsistence-level living for farmers with 
Table 4.4.4 Cost-benefit matrix for the biogas CDM project at Enshi Tujia and 






CER  947    0   20   967
Saving of fossil fuel    0 4,698    0  4,698
Saving of chemical 
fertilizer




   0 2,085 1,000  3,085
Reserve for write-off <947    0    0  <947
Profit   >0 8,426  –980 >7,445
Notes:
CER price is assumed as US$10 per tonne of CO2-equivalent.
Discount rate and credit period are assumed as 10 per cent and 10 years respec-
tively.
Transaction cost is assumed as zero with consideration to the local-government-
initiated CDM project, while collateral is counted on as a reserve for write-off.
Savings of fossil fuel and chemical fertilizer are assumed to be the same as Table 




no social security from the government. Farmers who have sold their 
land-use right become employed workers without social security, and are 
more dependent on their employers and more vulnerable to external 
conditions (Shimizu, 2005).
We can draw two findings from this case. First, small-scale livestock-
waste CDM projects can be financially viable only when the government 
can build institutions that prohibit farmers from migration in the current 
context of China. Second, farmers can improve their living standard only 
when they can manage various kinds of risks, including price fluctuations 
for their agricultural products and natural disasters.
4-4-6 Agricultural policies and sustainable development
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the govern-
ment has discriminated against farmers through policies and institutions, 
such as the policy to keep agricultural prices low and prohibition of 
u rban migration under the household registration system. The repressed 
agricultural price was abolished in 1980 and there was official acceptance 
of the sale of surplus harvest, which increased farmers’ income in the 
1980s. But agricultural prices fell drastically in the 1990s because of ex-
cessive production. Land has been segmented and productivity reduced 
since 1980, because farmland area has decreased while the agrarian pop-
ulation has continued to grow. Underdeveloped distribution systems, such 
as lack of a credible appraisal mechanism, insufficient functioning of 
price a djustment systems and weak storage capability reflected in the 
lack of storage space and refrigerators, make it difficult for farmers to sell 
their products at the most favourable terms (ibid.). As a result, farmers’ 
absolute income has declined after a peak in 1997 (Shimizu, 2006).
To supplement agricultural income, many farmers have a second job at 
medium- or small-scale companies or work as manual labourers for long 
periods. However, the household registration system makes it difficult for 
farmers to move to large cities to obtain urban household registration 
that would give them access to various public services there. Central 
g overnment developed a plan to abolish the differentiation between agri-
cultural and non-agricultural (urban) household registration in approxi-
mately five years from 2000 and put an end to the planned management 
of farmers’ transfer to small cities. Accordingly, in 2001 several provinces 
ended rural and urban household registration and unified them into resi-
dent household registration. However, since the government of a large 
city can set its own conditions for issuing permits to incoming migrants, 
the acquisition of an urban household registration is still difficult. There-
fore, types of jobs that incoming farmers can find are limited to contract 
labour at factories or manual labour with high risks and severe working 
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conditions, such as construction work. Such jobs provide minimal wages 
and do not offer social insurance. Knowing that only unstable and risky 
jobs are available, farmers working in a city do not sell their land-use 
right, thereby securing their living. Hence, no agricultural productivity 
improvement is potentially gained by expanding the scale of production, 
while more farmland is left unattended and barren. In addition, no group 
to represent the interests of farmers is allowed to organize, and the pro-
portion of farmers in the population is small compared to that of bureau-
crats in the People’s Congress: there are few institutions that incorporate 
farmers’ opinions into policy-making processes (Korogi, 2005).6
To make CDM projects advance sustainable development in rural 
areas, it is necessary to modify the existing policies further to overcome 
the problems of farmers, rural areas and agriculture. As a first step, it is 
important to establish political institutions that reflect the opinions of 
farmers, and allow farmers, without regard to their type of household reg-
istration, to receive the same public services enjoyed by urban people, 
such as social security, healthcare and education.7
Such reforms have been advanced, however, only in policy areas that 
central government can deal with by increasing public expenditure. Re-
distribution policies such as property tax, inheritance tax and the estab-
lishment of a social security fund have not been realized because of 
disagreements within the Communist Party, backed by fierce opposition 
from wealthier people. Also, a stamp tax hike for stock transactions, 
which was passed in 2007, was cancelled to prevent stock prices falling at 
the beginning of 2008.
In addition, there seems to be no end to forced expropriations and de-
velopment of land by local governments, ignoring environmental impact 
assessments and farmers’ resistance to such actions. The forced land ex-
propriation is pushed by the fact that local governments receive far 
greater income from property development than from taxes, and heads 
and officials of local governments are evaluated by economic perform-
ance in their jurisdiction. To mitigate the latter incentive, central govern-
ment is debating the use of an integrated environmental and economic 
indicator such as green GDP as an index for performance evaluation. In 
reality, however, only three environmental indicators are taken into ac-
count: total amount of sulphur dioxide emissions, total amount of chem-
ical oxygen demand discharge and energy consumption per unit of GDP. 
Environmental deterioration caused by forced expropriations and land 
redevelopment is not properly taken into account: rather, these actions 
receive high marks in economic performance indicators.
When these problems are overcome, a greater number of CDM 
projects in rural areas would be proposed and implemented, providing 





This chapter has shown that the Chinese government became active in 
CDM projects after recognizing these would advance the sustainable de-
velopment that the country wants to realize. It has promoted biogas 
projects for small-scale pig farms as a way of promoting renewable en-
ergy and preventing deforestation, as well as reducing poverty in rural 
areas. Recently, a CDM project was introduced to diffuse biogas digestion 
to small-scale farmers over a wider area. Despite the project’s potentially 
large positive net profit, uptake is slow due lack of profitability to project 
developers and financiers, high installation costs to farmers and their 
m igration to cities as contract or manual labourers. To ensure profits to 
them and sustainability of the project, local governments have to imple-
ment the project by themselves, provide loans to farmers and recover the 
costs, as seen in the case of Enshi Tujia and Miao. This chapter finds that 
this is due mainly to farmers’ perceived substantially high risks, which are 
ascribed not only to the size of initial investments but also to institutions 
that discriminate against farmers, such as the existing agricultural poli-
cies, the household registration system and a performance evaluation sys-
tem that cannot reduce local governments’ appetite for development nor 
provide incentives to promote environmental preservation actively.
Notes
1. Jiji Tsushin, 17 June 2009 (www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=200906/2009061700048).
2. In Shanwei, Guangdong province, there was a protest by farmers opposing land expro-
priation for a wind power plant, which was subsequently quelled by a large-scale police 
action (Shimizu, 2006: 350 –352).
3. Interview at Hunan Province Development and Reform Commission, March 2006.
4. Swine influenza emerged in vast area of China during the period 2005–2006, forcing 
many farmers to sell their hogs at a low price. According to an interview conducted by 
the author and other researchers in Liuan, Anhui province, in 2007–2008 swine influenza 
was one of the major reasons why farmers abandoned small-scale farming and hog farm-
ing and went to large cities for long-term work.
5. All land in China is state owned. However, the Property Law of 2007 allows automatic 
continuation of a land-use right after its predetermined lease period ends, as well as its 
sale and purchase.
6. This is due to the disparity in the ratio of representatives per head of population in 
u rban and rural areas. It was decided in 1992 that one representative for the National 
People’s Congress should be elected for every 960,000 people in rural areas and for 
every 240,000 people in urban areas,
7. The tax reform implemented in Anhui province reduced the “unreasonable” fees on 
farmers by simplifying various fees. However, it led to shortage of revenues for local 
g overnments despite the 20 billion yuan subsidies from the central government. This 
d elayed and stopped salary payments to schoolteachers and made the operation of com-
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pulsory education in rural areas difficult. As a result, such reforms did not spread nation-
wide (Yan, 2002).
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